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I cut my teeth studying the German Constitutional Court’s (GCC) relationship with
the European Court of Justice (ECJ). A recent article in the Financial Times used the
metaphor of a dance to explain the GCC’s history of pushing back against the ECJ’s
authority. In 2001, I called it a game of chicken. I don’t worry that playing chicken
with the ECJ inevitably leads to European disintegration. The GCC’s ECB ruling
is, however, the wrong decision issued at the wrong time. I agree with Martin Wolf
that economic policy-makers will and should ignore the ruling, and for this reason I
expect the GCC to step back from the brink, once again. But harm is nonetheless
being inflicted on a tottering global economy, a fragile European project, and a
disintegrating popular support for the rule of law.
The GCC has been here before – in the hot seat being lambasted by critics for
hastening European disintegration. Its 1974 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft ruling
insisted that the GCC would act as the final arbiter of European law supremacy
inside of Germany so long as (‘solange’) the European Community lacked ‘a
catalogue of fundamental rights decided on by a parliament of settled validity.’ In
the 1970s, this seemed like an impossible hill for the European Community to climb.
The GCC swerved before the EU reached the mountain top, and amazingly the EU
climbed the mountain. 
The GCC has repeated its chicken strategy, often to good ends. When in 1993
the GCC issued its Maastricht ruling, threatening to declare ultra vires European
acts inapplicable in Germany, the EU met Germany more than halfway in soliciting
political authorization and avoiding the ‘ultra-vires’ charge. The GCC also played a
background role in the ‘Kadi’ saga, and its behind-the-scenes pressure positively
contributed to the ECJ’s demand for serious individualized justifications for freezing
the assets of individuals, which led the UN Security Council to pass new rules and
better justify decisions to classify a person as a funder of terrorists. These examples
produced good ends because the purpose was legal accountability that pressured
international political actors to better justify their decisions, to take human rights
more seriously, and to respect national democratic and constitutional decision-
making processes. 
This time, however, the GCC has entangled itself in a policy debate about what is
the best monetary policy. This time, the GCC is playing a judicialized version of what
political scientists call a ‘two level negotiation game’. When German decision-makers
can plausibly claim a hard domestic political constraint, such as a constitutional
constraint, then other actors at the bargaining table are more likely to move towards
the German position. The GCC’s intervention seems designed to strengthen German
voices in political bargaining, but this is the wrong way to deploy.
I don’t worry that the GCC seems to have carried through with its threat to declare
an ‘ultra vires’ European act inapplicable. It has actually done this before, and if EU
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policy is deficient and uncorrected, the GCC should do so again. Nor do I worry that
Poland and Hungary may be tempted to pervert the GCC’s precedent in nefarious
ways. These countries’ leaders and their stacked supreme courts will do so no
matter how the GCC had ruled. 
I do worry that the GCC has acceded to the plaintiffs’ policy desire, ordering the
Bundesbank to ignore both the ECB and the ECJ. In the past we could believe
that the GCC wanted to protect human rights, democracy and the rule of law. Can
we believe this now? For me, three factors make this particular ruling especially
pointless and dangerous: 1) the ruling involves monetary policy, 2) the current
context is one of radical uncertainty, and 3) the European and democratic projects
are especially vulnerable. 
The true hubris of the GCC’s ECB decision ruling is the belief that the GCC can
better determine monetary policy. Monetary policy is a Keynesian beauty contest.
Because there is no objective way to know ‘who is the prettiest,’ betting on the
beauty contest involves picking what you think other selectors will choose. Said
differently, monetary policy is a signal that tries to encourage lenders, borrowers,
and consumers to keep the spending machine going so that the economy does not
seize up. There is no ‘right’ signal. There is only a confidence game.
Since the 1930s, the German confidence game has involved price stability. We can
understand Germany’s past inflation trauma. Yet for years economists have been
rethinking the conventional wisdom about inflation. Actual hyper-inflation is bad.
But old understandings of how loose monetary policies contribute to inflation have
been turned on their heads. Most economists outside of Germany, and many within,
believe that the old German orthodoxy is outdated and overly-conservative. Yet the
ECB is constrained by this orthodoxy, and it takes price stability into account even
though in recent years deflation has been a greater risk than inflation. But in contexts
of radical uncertainty, one cannot know the downstream effects of a decision.
Because the ‘risk’ that a bond-buying policy will create inflation is unknowable, as
a policy matter, the litigants and the GCC are wrong. Nor does the ruling provide
a helpful legal check. The ECB, with the support of European leaders, made a
reasonable decision for justifiable reasons. The ECB and Bundesbank – not the
GCC – have the political authority to make these decisions. Why the GCC thinks the
legal strategy of ‘proportionality balancing’ will do better is baffling. 
I am not a blind member of the ‘central bank independence’ fan-club. The entire
financial sector needs more sunlight and accountability. But the solution is not to
insert German judges into Euro-monetary policy-making. The current moment is
even more fragile than Greek and Eurozone financial crisis, when the GCC first
suggested that it would intervene in European monetary policy. I don’t know what
the right monetary strategy is for this moment, but I do know that the German
constitution and German constitutional judges do not know better. I see no upside
to the GCC seemingly joining the populists in rejecting expertise and the valid
exercises of political authority. We have a pandemic producing depression-level
economic contractions, and accountable political leaders need to be able address
popular concerns about austerity. If price-stability-induced conservatism or more
economic turmoil are a result, then liberal democracy may be further threatened. 
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The best political and legal strategy for monetary policy in times of radical
uncertainty is to let the ECB duke the issue out with the various national central
banks, insulated from yet influenced by EU political leaders. The GCC and the ECJ
already made them justify their decisions. If they still mess up, central bankers will be
held accountable by economic actors and the political process. 
The GCC needs to figure out when national constitutional checks are an appropriate
and helpful part of an international system of democratic checks and balances. As
far as I know, no judicial body has been foolish enough to insert itself into the
monetary policy-making process, for good reason. The GCC should not be putting
a hand on the German scale of price stability. Here is a guide: The GCC is most
helpful when it defends human rights, democracy, German federalism, and a
reasoned respect for domestic and international law. The goal is a culture of
constitutional obedience, not an enhanced German voice, a German fiat over
international policy-making, or an arrogant suggestion that experts and European
institutions lack the authority while German Constitutional judges know how to
navigate radical uncertainty.
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